A specially crafted web-page can cause a type confusion vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer 8 through to 11. An attacker can cause code to be executed with a stack layout it does not expect, or have code attempt to execute a method of an object using a vftable, when that object does not have a vftable. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution.
Microsoft Internet Explorer 8, 9, 10 and 11
An attacker would need to get a target user to open a specially crafted web-page. Disabling Javascript should prevent an attacker from triggering the vulnerable code path.
In an SVG page, a copy of the hasFeature
method of a DOMImplementation
object from a HTML page is created. This copy is used as a method of a new
object and called with one argument. This can cause at least two issues in the
MSHTML!Method_VARIANTBOOLp_BSTR_o0oVARIANT
function of MSIE:
o. x();
in the
repro to o. x(new Array)
.MSHTML!CBase:: PrivateGetDispID
is called; this
is probably caused by a type confusion bug: the code expects a VARIANT
object of one type, but is working on an object of a different type.The repro was tested on x86 systems and does not reproduce this issue on x64 systems. I did not determine if this is because x64 systems are not affected, or because the repro needs to be modified to work on x64 systems.
Exploitation was not attempted. I reversed Method_VARIANTBOOLp_BSTR_o0oVARIANT
only sufficiently to get an idea of the root cause, but not enough to determine
exactly what is going on or how to control the issue for command execution.
Calling the isPrototypeOf
method of the DOMImplementation
interface as a
function results in type confusion where an object is assumed to implement
IUnknown
when in fact it does not. The code attempts to call the Release
method of IUnknown
through the vftable at offset 0, but since the object has
no vftables, a member property is stored at this offset, which appears to have
a static value 002dc6c0
. An attacker that is able to control this value, or
allocate memory and store data at that address, may be able to execute
arbitrary code.
No attempts were made to further reverse the code and determine the exact root cause. A few attempts were made to control the value at offset 0 of the object in question, as well as get another object in its place with a different value at this location, but both efforts were brief and unsuccessful.